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Debates about the role that Islam should play in shaping politics and political systems have been around since the beginning 
of Islam itself. Islamism as a sociopoliti-
cal movement, however, originated in the 
twentieth century, its beginnings linked 
to problems associated with imperialism, 
modern states, rapid urbanization and 
the rise of mass societies. The organized 
expression of Islamism began in 1928, 
when Hasan al-Banna founded the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt.1 The Muslim Broth-
erhood and its affiliates remain the gold 
standard for the institutional expression of 
Islamist thought.2 
While the Muslim Brotherhood en-
gaged in violence from time to time in 
Egypt and elsewhere during the middle 
of the twentieth century, Islamist politi-
cal thought in general was not predicated 
on the use of violence to achieve political 
ends.3 This began to change in the 1960s, 
as new schools of Islamist thought began to 
advocate the use of violence to accomplish 
their political goals, usually the overthrow 
of local regimes that were viewed as apos-
tate. Within the Sunni world, the most im-
portant of these new thinkers who stressed 
the role of violent jihad was Sayyid Qutb.4 
Like most jihadi ideologues, Qutb was a 
lay Muslim rather than a cleric, employed 
within Egypt’s Ministry of Education and 
fairly worldly, having spent two years in 
the late 1940s in the United States. As 
with the rest of the Muslim Brotherhood 
leadership, Qutb ran afoul of the new Free 
Officers regime, which came to power in 
Egypt in 1952. He spent years in prison be-
fore finally being hanged by Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s regime in 1966. 
Qutb’s fatal offense was writing the 
slim volume Maalim f’il-Tariq (Mile-
stones), in which he called for the violent 
overthrow of Nasser’s regime on the 
grounds that it was jahili, anti-Islamic. 
Qutb’s book was a call to arms for jihadis 
throughout the Sunni Muslim world, in 
much the same way that Vladimir Lenin’s 
What Is to Be Done? was for Communists.5 
Qutb’s work provided the intellectual 
foundations for the jihadi movement in the 
contemporary Sunni world and remains 
influential in jihadi circles to this day.6 
While this essay focuses on global ji-
had among Sunni Muslims (there is no real 
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equivalent of global jihad among the Shia), 
it would be remiss not to mention that the 
intellectual foundations of modern jihadism 
in the Shia world arose at nearly the same 
time. In 1970, while in exile in Najaf, Iraq, 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini delivered a 
series of lectures on Islamic government 
in which he argued that the shah’s govern-
ment was illegitimate and un-Islamic and 
must be removed.7 The implication was 
clear: violence might well be necessary to 
effect regime change in Iran. Khomeini was 
the most famous voice to articulate a Shia 
rationale for violence in order to imple-
ment a more just political and social order, 
beginning in the 1960s; however, he was 
not alone. For example, from the late 1960s 
until his death under mysterious circum-
stances in 1977, Ali Shariati (a Sorbonne 
PhD) articulated a political-religious ideol-
ogy that married Shiism with Marxism, 
much as Liberation Theology among leftist 
Catholic priests had woven together Chris-
tianity and Marxism in the 1970s.8
Thus, as we date the emergence of 
Islamism to 1928 with the establishment of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, we can like-
wise date the emergence of modern jihadi 
thought — the call for violence to imple-
ment a political agenda under the banner 
of Islam — to the 1960s. Their intellec-
tual foundations now laid, both Islamism 
and jihadism surged in importance in the 
Muslim world in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
reasons for the dramatic rise of these two 
phenomena are complex and varied, in-
cluding the sudden strengthening of Saudi 
Arabia and other conservative oil states 
and the general failure of secular republics 
in the Middle East to deliver economic 
growth and good governance.9
The key point in this discussion is that, 
in both intellectual construct and practice, 
neither Islamism nor jihadism contained 
an important global aspect. Like Christian-
ity, Islam is a proselytizing religion, and 
thus pious Muslims (like pious Christians) 
believe aspirationally that the whole world 
must one day share their religion. As a 
result, one can always find this type of 
global religious reference in the writings 
of Islamist and jihadi thinkers (and other 
Muslims), but this is different from placing 
a global strategy for change or violence at 
the center of one’s political project. Early 
jihadi thinkers in particular focused on lo-
cal issues, primarily what Muhammad Abd 
al-Salam Faraj would later call the “near 
enemy”: local Muslim regimes.10 
Global jihadism emerged as an off-
shoot of the broader jihadi movement in 
the 1980s or, more specifically, with the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in Decem-
ber 1979. While the global jihadi move-
ment has grown substantially over the past 
four decades, it has remained a fairly small 
component of militant jihadism, which still 
overwhelmingly focuses on local issues. 
Global jihadism has now witnessed four 
distinct waves. None is part of some grand-
er conspiracy, but rather a response to a 
specific crisis from which a particular idea 
of global jihad emerged. Each wave has 
had a defining idea about what was meant 
by global jihad and at least one ideologue 
who most closely articulated it. In every 
case, the idea of global jihad was clearly 
shaped by the crisis from which it arose. 
I will briefly summarize the four waves 
here and then treat each one in more detail 
below. The first wave of global jihad began 
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979 and the subsequent call for Muslims 
from around the world to come and help 
liberate Afghanistan. This jihad against the 
Soviets continued throughout the 1980s 
to be primarily a classic anti-colonial 
jihad, but during this time a jihadi offshoot 
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emerged dedicated to the idea of freeing all 
occupied Muslim lands around the world. 
Although this would begin with Afghani-
stan, the global jihad was to move on to 
other lands viewed as properly Muslim but 
occupied by infidels — from Palestine to 
Kashmir to Mindanao and, ultimately, to 
Spain (al-Andalus). The idea was that a 
“solid base” of mujahideen warriors would 
travel the world working with local Mus-
lim populations to liberate Muslim lands, 
forming a type of “Jihadi International.”11 
This first wave came to an end after the 
Soviets left Afghanistan and the Jihadi 
International idea proved impractical. 
The second wave of global jihad — 
Bin Laden’s “America First” or far-enemy 
strategy — can be dated from about 1996. 
It arose out of a crisis of defeat, particu-
larly in Egypt and Algeria, where jihadi 
armed insurrections to overthrow local 
regimes had largely ground to a halt in 
failure. The defeat in Egypt was par-
ticularly stinging to Bin Laden, given the 
importance of Egypt as the most populated 
and strategically important Arab country. 
This second wave of global jihad had its 
heyday from 1998 to 2001 with a series of 
increasingly audacious direct attacks on 
American targets, culminating in the terror 
attacks of September 11, 2001. What came 
to be known as “al-Qaeda Central” was 
largely defeated by 2002 but sputtered on 
in diminished form under Bin Laden until 
2011, when he was killed by U.S. Navy 
Seals at his compound in Pakistan.
The third distinct wave of global jihad 
began with the overthrow of the Iraqi state 
in 2003 by U.S. forces and intensified with 
the civil war in Syria that began in 2011. 
TABLE 1. The Four Waves of Global Jihad, 1979-2017















II. America First 
(Far Enemy), 
1996-2011
1997 defeat of 





tion to drive U.S. 






sion of Iraq, 2011 
civil war in Syria
Apostasy, aided 
by Shia rule






Bakr Naji, Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi
IV. Personal 
Jihad  (Keep 
Hope Alive!), 
2001-present













Robinson.indd   72 8/11/2017   11:11:10 AM
73
Robinson: The Four Waves of Global Jihad
The creation of essentially “ungoverned 
lands” in the Sunni areas of northwestern 
Iraq and eastern Syria allowed for the 
creation of a new form of global jihad, one 
focused on establishing a territorial jihadi 
state. The end of this third wave of global 
jihad comes with the end of the “Islamic 
Caliphate” as a territorial state, likely in 
2017. The “Islamic State” group, or ISIS, 
will no doubt continue as a terror organiza-
tion, but the loss of its territorial state will 
mark the end of an era.
The fourth wave of global jihad began 
almost simultaneously with the third, but 
out of a different crisis and with a very dif-
ferent idea about global jihad. It emerged 
from the defeat of the Taliban in 2001 and 
the loss of the Islamic “emirate.” The de-
feat of the Taliban (and the near-destruction 
of its al-Qaeda allies) was the crisis that 
prompted Abu Musab al-Suri to rethink 
global jihad for an era when the movement 
was on the defensive, asking the question 
of how global jihad could survive to fight 
another day. His answer was networked but 
decentralized jihad fardi, personal jihad, 
undertaken by individuals and small cells 
under the banner of global jihad, mak-
ing full use of the Internet and other new 
information technologies. It is this fourth 
wave of global jihad in which the world 
finds itself today, a wave that, while not a 
high-level strategic threat, does constitute a 
durable and deadly source of fear.
JIHADI INTERNATIONAL, 1979-90
In an attempt to save an allied regime 
on the verge of collapse, Soviet troops 
invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. 
Prior to the Soviet invasion, the “jihad” 
in Afghanistan against the leftist regime 
in Kabul had not gained significant atten-
tion among jihadi audiences, even though 
it was on the cusp of victory. The armed 
takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca 
by Saudi jihadis earlier in 1979 was a far 
more notable event, as was the overthrow 
of the shah in Shia Iran at the beginning 
of 1979. However, the military occupation 
of Muslim Afghanistan by “infidel” Soviet 
troops changed the calculus and gave 
much greater international attention to the 
conflict in Afghanistan.
The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan 
fit into a dispossession narrative common 
in the Muslim world, and its theme reso-
nated even more among Islamists of all 
stripes: the gradual loss of Muslim lands 
around the world to non-Muslim forces 
since the high point of Muslim expan-
sion in the seventeenth century. The jihad 
to drive out the Soviets would become a 
cause célèbre in the Muslim world and 
generate among jihadis the idea that Mus-
lim warriors, united by their faith, could be 
nearly invincible.
The man responsible for laying the 
intellectual foundations for this first wave 
of global jihad was Abdullah Yusuf Az-
zam, a Palestinian-Jordanian who was both 
well educated and well traveled, having 
studied and taught in Jordan, Syria, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.12 Assassinated 
in 1989 in Peshawar, Pakistan, Azzam is 
still considered one of the most important 
intellectuals in jihadi circles, both as a 
popularizer of the Afghan jihad and as an 
important innovator in jihadi thought. It is 
fair to say that Azzam was the founder of 
the idea of global jihad.
Unlike most jihadi ideologues, Azzam 
was a trained cleric, having received his 
doctorate in Islamic jurisprudence from the 
famed al-Azhar University in Cairo. This 
clerical training gave Azzam’s fundamen-
tal radicalism a more traditional bent, and 
also gave his writings significant credibil-
ity among fellow radicals.
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Azzam laid out his arguments in a 
series of texts, the two most famous being 
the 1984 fatwa (religious opinion) The 
Defense of Muslim Lands and the 1987 
book Join the Caravan. Azzam’s basic 
argument may be summarized as follows: 
Muslim lands have been lost over time to 
non-Muslim forces, and they need to be 
taken back for use by the Muslim ummah 
(community). The two most important 
places to begin the reconquest of Muslim 
lands globally are Afghanistan and Pal-
estine. Where Muslim lands have been 
occupied, it is obligatory for all Muslims 
(fard ayn) to participate in their recapture, 
which can only be accomplished through 
violent jihad. No other method will be 
successful, since occupiers will not readily 
give up such territory. The strategy is for a 
solid base of mujahidin (the “beating heart 
and thinking mind of jihad”) to travel the 
world and work with Muslim communities 
to undertake “peoples’ jihads” to liberate 
occupied Muslim lands.
Azzam’s signature innovation was the 
call for global jihad based on a “solid base” 
(qaidat al-sulba) of well-trained Muslim 
mujahidin from around the world, a sort 
of “Jihadi International.” Azzam’s vision 
was at once both radical and traditional: 
he interpreted jihad in a far more glob-
ally expansive manner than had been the 
case previously, but he maintained a strict 
focus on territory. Armed jihad to liberate 
occupied land is an orthodox, traditional 
use of the concept of jihad. Indeed, Azzam 
rejected the takfir argument made most 
strenuously by Ayman al-Zawahiri, that the 
post-Afghan jihad should focus on over-
throwing apostate Muslim regimes, begin-
ning in Egypt, not on liberating territory, 
which would be far more difficult. Azzam 
saw the use of takfir, ex-communication 
of Muslims, to be a slippery slope leading 
directly to fitna, internecine Muslim dis-
cord. For Azzam, takfir would weaken the 
ummah rather than strengthen it.13
Azzam’s radicalism was not limited to 
the expansive, globalized nature of armed 
jihad. Azzam agreed with Sayyid Qutb 
that armed jihad was not an episodic set 
of discrete events (the orthodox Muslim 
view) but rather a permanent state for all 
Muslims, reminiscent of Leon Trotsky’s 
argument for permanent revolution. Azzam 
can also be credited with the idea of the 
“cult of martyrdom,” including religious 
justification for suicide bombings. Suicide 
is a mortal sin in Islam, as in Catholicism, 
making Azzam’s task of justifying suicide 
operations difficult.
Azzam’s call for young Muslim men 
to “join the caravan,” and come to Af-
ghanistan to fight, successfully recruited 
thousands to the cause, although foreign 
fighters did not play a decisive role in the 
ultimate defeat of the Soviets in Afghani-
stan. The withdrawal of the USSR in early 
1989 left the followers of global jihad with 
a dilemma: where to take the jihad next? 
Should they follow Azzam’s advice and 
fight in Palestine or some other occupied 
Muslim lands, or follow Zawahiri’s takfiri 
line and put their resources into over-
throwing apostate rulers in the Muslim 
world, particularly Hosni Mubarak? More 
traditional Muslims simply left for home, 
knowing that the particular jihad to liberate 
Afghanistan was over. The debate among 
global jihadis was furious and may have 
contributed to Azzam’s assassination by 
car bomb in Pakistan in November 1989.14 
The Soviet withdrawal, along with 
Azzam’s death, helped bring to a close the 
first wave of global jihad. One last effort to 
realize Azzam’s vision of a Jihadi Interna-
tional that would travel to occupied zones 
to liberate land occurred in Kuwait follow-
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ing the Iraqi invasion in August 1990. Az-
zam’s former pupil and colleague, Osama 
bin Laden, approached the Saudi royal 
family with an offer: instead of bringing in 
the Americans and other infidels to liberate 
Kuwait, allow Bin Laden to put the band 
back together, bring in 100,000 mujahidin 
from around the world, and liberate Kuwait 
with Muslim hands. The Saudis, of course, 
had no interest in enabling tens of thou-
sands of foreign jihadis to roam around the 
kingdom, and declined the offer, setting a 
spurned Bin Laden off on his own path to 
change the nature of global jihad.
AMERICA FIRST, 1996-2011
The Saudi decision to reject Bin Lad-
en’s offer to bring in foreign mujahidin to 
liberate Kuwait tipped the scales decisively 
against the idea of a Jihadi International, as 
it proved to be unworkable in practice. The 
rejection also profoundly affected Bin Lad-
en’s thinking, bringing him much closer (at 
least for a few years) to Zawahiri’s takfiri 
idea that the fundamental problem was the 
nature of regimes in the Muslim world. 
How could any proper Muslim leader 
prefer the use of hundreds of thousands of 
American and other infidel forces to — as 
the jihadi narrative would have it — the 
genuine and pure mujahidin, who had 
just demonstrated their power in defeat-
ing one of the world’s two superpowers in 
Afghanistan? For Bin Laden, this decision 
demonstrated an intrinsic corruption.
In the early 1990s, banned from Saudi 
Arabia because of his growing militancy 
and holed up in Sudan, Bin Laden had little 
to do other than entertain the occasional 
jihadi visitor and perhaps lend a hand to 
militants next door in Somalia.15 At the 
broader level, there was very little, if any, 
organized global jihad during this period. 
Local groups remained active, although 
most were now on the defensive against re-
newed regime efforts in the post-Cold War 
regional environment. The conflict in Bos-
nia following the collapse of Yugoslavia 
attracted a large number of Muslim volun-
teers from different lands, but it would be 
an exaggeration to say they were fighting 
under the banner of global jihad. 
Indeed, the 1990s were proving to be 
a very difficult decade for jihadis of all 
stripes, whether local or global. After 20 
years of sustained success, either taking 
power in countries or becoming significant 
political actors, both Islamists and jihadis 
were losing ground as the 1990s wore on.16 
The two most important examples of this 
reversal of fortune were Egypt and Algeria. 
The Egyptian regime had proved unable to 
stamp out either the growing influence of 
Islamism or the low-intensity conflict of 
Egyptian jihadis, led by both the Islamic 
Group (al-gamma al-islamiyya) and the 
Jihad Organization (tanzim al-jihad). Areas 
of Cairo had become dangerous places for 
police and security personnel to visit after 
dark, including one very large neighbor-
hood periodically referred to as the “Is-
lamic State of Imbaba.” Predictions of 
the likely fall of the Mubarak regime and 
the coming to power of Islamists of some 
stripe were commonplace.17 Yet by 1997, 
to the chagrin of Bin Laden and other ji-
hadis, the insurrection in Egypt was largely 
defeated, with many jihadi leaders calling 
for a ceasefire and acknowledging that 
their path of violence had been a mistake.18 
In Algeria, the story was largely the 
same. The political liberalization that 
began in the late 1980s swept into power 
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS in its 
French acronym, essentially the equiva-
lent of the Muslim Brotherhood) in the 
1990 municipal elections across Algeria. 
With the FIS halfway to the goal of win-
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ning national parliamentary elections, the 
Algerian military staged a coup in Janu-
ary 1992, stopped the elections and took 
power, prompting a bloody civil war. 
While Egypt’s conflict was generally one 
of low intensity, the Algerian civil war 
was all-out and bloody. It featured some 
extremely gruesome acts of terror against 
civilians, the likes of which would not be 
seen again in the region until the rise of 
ISIS. By 1994, the Islamists and jihadis 
were mostly fighting among themselves, 
and, as in Egypt, by 1997 the civil war had 
been largely won by the Algerian state.19
How did Bin Laden make sense of this 
reversal of fortune? Was it not inevitable 
that apostate regimes would collapse under 
the righteous pressure of the mujahidin? 
And how was it that local apostate re-
gimes in many parts of the region — not 
just in Egypt and Algeria — had proven 
to be much more durable than Bin Laden 
had expected? It was in this context that 
Bin Laden developed his “America First” 
idea. According to this notion, it was U.S. 
support for apostate regimes that allowed 
them to survive. The logical strategy, then, 
was to drive the United States from the 
Middle East, thereby making local regimes 
more vulnerable.20 
Bin Laden drew his inspiration from 
Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, the ideo-
logue for the jihadi group that had assas-
sinated Anwar Sadat in 1981. In his tract 
to fellow jihadis on the “missing duty” of 
armed jihad (al-farida al-ghaiba), Faraj 
warned his fellow jihadis not to waste 
precious resources fighting the “far en-
emy,” which Faraj defined as Israel. Even 
if jihadis successfully liberated Jerusalem, 
apostate Arab regimes in Cairo and else-
where would end up claiming credit for it. 
Rather, Faraj urged the jihadi movement to 
focus on the “near enemy” of local apos-
tate regimes, beginning with the overthrow 
of Sadat.21
Borrowing Faraj’s near-enemy/far-
enemy rubric, Bin Laden turned it upside 
down in two ways. First, he decided that 
Israel was just a symptom of a larger prob-
lem; it was the United States, not Israel, 
that should be viewed as the far enemy 
(adu baid). Second, Bin Laden believed 
that it would be impossible to overthrow 
apostate regimes in Cairo, Riyadh and 
elsewhere without first breaking their links 
with Washington. So the focus of direct 
action should not be on the near enemy 
(adu qarib) of the apostate regimes — not 
yet, anyway — but rather on American 
targets, both military and civilian. Once 
the Americans had been driven out of the 
region, he assumed that the local regimes 
would fall rather easily. Bin Laden was 
convinced that the Americans would not 
have the stomach for a fight, given how 
easily they were driven out of Lebanon 
and Somalia.
The first iteration of Bin Laden’s 
transition to a “far enemy” or “America 
First” strategy was his 1996 “declaration 
of war,” written shortly after he had been 
forced out of Sudan and taken up residence 
in Afghanistan. This long and meandering 
document, appealing mostly to those in-
terested in internal Saudi dissent, received 
little attention at the time. It is something 
of a hybrid, still very much a takfiri-jihadi 
argument for the illegitimacy of the Saudi 
state (and the religious leadership that gave 
such a state legitimacy), but also bringing 
in the United States as the key enabling 
power that allowed not just apostasy in 
Saudi Arabia, but also anti-Islamic action 
in Palestine and across the region. With 
this document, Bin Laden kept one foot in 
the door of the takfiri near-enemy camp, 
but took a step with the other foot toward a 
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far-enemy strategy — something no jihadi 
ideologue had ever done.
Bin Laden’s clear and unequivocal 
move to an “America First” strategy came 
in the form of a 1998 fatwa against “Jews 
and Crusaders,” of which Bin Laden was 
the lead author. This document gener-
ated considerable criticism, both because 
Bin Laden did not have the religious 
credentials to issue a fatwa, and because 
he signed his name “Shaykh” Osama Bin 
Muhammad Bin Laden (thus implicitly 
claiming those credentials). Recogniz-
ing his overreach, Bin Laden never again 
signed a fatwa as a religious “shaykh.” The 
document itself was pure “far enemy”: the 
United States was in military occupation 
of the holy lands of Arabia, was engaged 
in aggression against Iraq and allowed the 
“petty state of the Jews” to occupy Jeru-
salem and murder Muslims. In short, the 
United States had “declared war on God, 
his Messenger, and all Muslims.” Thus, it 
was the duty of all Muslims to kill Ameri-
cans and their allies — civilian and mili-
tary — wherever possible, until Jerusalem 
and Mecca are liberated and the Americans 
“leave all the lands of Islam, defeated and 
unable to threaten any Muslim.”22
Bin Laden maintained his focus on the 
far-enemy strategy for the rest of his life, 
although the heyday of the strategy and 
of his revitalized al-Qaeda organization 
was brief. It dated from the issuance of 
this fatwa and al-Qaeda’s bombing of the 
American embassies in Nairobi and Dar 
es Salaam less than six months later to the 
near destruction of al-Qaeda in Afghani-
stan in 2002.
While the central al-Qaeda organiza-
tion did survive the loss of Afghanistan 
and the overthrow of its hosts, the Taliban, 
it never again amounted to a significant 
force that could threaten the survival of 
governments. In the post-9/11 period, al-
Qaeda gave rise to several offshoots, its af-
filiate in Yemen being the most successful 
(much of Yemen constituting “ungoverned 
space” over which the state had little influ-
ence).23 Other existing groups, such as al-
Shabab in Somalia, pledged loyalty to Bin 
Laden, largely because of the increased 
marketing leverage such an alliance might 
portend. But most of these affiliates were 
focused on local jihads and not particularly 
concerned with the ideological cornerstone 
of al-Qaeda — the thing that made it a 
global jihadi group and set it apart from all 
other jihadi groups: the focus on attacking 
America first to drive it out of the Muslim 
world. Only al-Qaeda’s Yemen affiliate, al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 
made attempts from time to time to inflict 
damage directly on the United States, most 
notably by the “underwear bomber,” Umar 
Faruq Abdulmutallab, in 2009. The death 
of Bin Laden at U.S. hands in 2011 and the 
rise of ISIS took the wind out of al-Qaeda 
central’s tattered sails.
CALIPHATE NOW! 2003-17
Neither Azzam’s quest to create a 
Jihadi International nor Bin Laden’s call to 
strike America First garnered large num-
bers of adherents among potential jihadis, 
the vast majority of whom were focused on 
issues in their own countries. By contrast, 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
was far more successful in attracting re-
cruits and resources from around the world 
than its two global jihadi predecessors. 
Perhaps, ironically, the reason ISIS proved 
more successful was in large measure 
because it was less global and more local. 
ISIS was quite traditional in some ways: 
fighting foreign invaders in the heart of the 
Middle East, establishing its own territo-
rial state and working to overthrow Shia 
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regimes in Baghdad and Damascus. In 
terms of extreme Sunni fundamentalism, 
ISIS was rather orthodox. Even the radi-
cal aspects of ISIS — the declaration of 









ior after early 
Saudi state-
building attempts, primarily in the nine-
teenth century.25 Thus, of the four waves 
of global jihad, ISIS has the least claim to 
a global agenda, but the greatest ability to 
recruit — two closely related phenomena. 
As a more orthodox Sunni extremist group, 
ISIS appealed to a broader audience than 
al-Qaeda.
A reasonable question suggests itself: 
why should ISIS be considered a global 
jihad phenomenon, instead of just an-
other local Middle Eastern jihadi group? 
There are three reasons for this. First, ISIS 
successfully recruited large numbers of 
fighters and other resources from all over 
the world. Approximately 30,000-40,000 
people from at least 86 countries joined the 
fighting in Iraq and Syria, most under the 
ISIS banner, including about 5,000 western 
Europeans.26 Second, ISIS has a global vi-
sion: to bring the world’s 1.6 billion Mus-
lims under its authority and sovereignty. 
This was the meaning of declaring a “ca-
liphate” as opposed to an Islamic “emir-
ate”: a caliphate claims authority over all 
of the world’s Muslims, while an emirate 
claims authority only over those people 
inside the territory it controls. Third, ISIS 
has shown a global reach, from terrorist 
attacks in Europe to affiliated emirates 
around the Muslim world. It should be 
noted that ISIS violence in the West only 
began after Western countries started to 
bomb its “caliphate” in parts of Iraq and 
Syria; those 
acts of terror 
were moti-





mately led to 
the formation 
of ISIS was the U.S. decision to invade 
Iraq in 2003. That invasion, widely seen 
as a major strategic blunder by the United 
States, created the chaos and grievances 
from which ISIS emerged. The American 
occupation of Iraq created a platform for 
a jihadi radical from Jordan, Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, to implement his violent 
program through his recently formed 
group, al-tawhid wal-jihad (monotheism 
and jihad). Zarqawi had a long history of 
radical politics and prison time in Jordan; 
his primary focus was initially on inciting 
sectarian war against the Shia. At the same 
time, al-Qaeda, in its diminished state, was 
looking to gain a toehold in Iraq to fight 
the Americans. Negotiations between Zar-
qawi and al-Qaeda did not go well at first, 
as Zarqawi clearly did not want to pledge 
allegiance (baya) to Bin Laden — and, in 
any case, he had a different vision for jihad 
than did al-Qaeda.
By October 2004, however, Zarqawi 
decided that joining with al-Qaeda made 
the most sense for the growth of his group. 
Thus was formed the Organization of Jihad 
in Mesopotamia (tanzim qaidat al-jihad 
fi bilad al-rafidayn), better known in the 
West as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). While 
The crisis that ultimately led to the 
formation of ISIS was the U.S. decision to 
invade Iraq in 2003. That invasion, widely 
seen as a major strategic blunder by the 
United States, created the chaos and 
grievances from which ISIS emerged. 
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AQI was technically a branch of al-Qaeda 
for two years, it remained very much a 
Zarqawi operation with Zarqawi’s goals. 
AQI focused its efforts on bombing Shia 
targets and publicly executing foreign-
ers, only periodically attacking American 
military forces in Iraq. Straying so far from 
al-Qaeda’s party line earned Zarqawi a 
letter of rebuke from Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
who noted that the issue of the Shia was 
best saved for a later date, as American 
forces were the proper target at that point. 
Besides, the posting of videos of execu-
tions of civilians was doing serious harm 
to the image of the jihadi cause.27 
Relations between Zarqawi and al-
Qaeda, never great, continued to sour until 
Zarqawi was killed by U.S. forces in June 
2006. Four months later, AQI formally 
broke with al-Qaeda and declared itself a 
state: the Islamic State in Iraq (al-dawla 
al-Islamiyya fil-Iraq), or ISI.28 The idea 
of a territorial state appears to have taken 
root, at least in part, as a solution to the 
natural tension that had arisen between 
what became the ISI alliance of jihadis and 
Iraqi Sunni nationalists: a territorial state 
to appease the nationalists, but run under 
sharia to appeal to the jihadis.29 However, 
without Zarqawi’s charismatic (if thug-
gish) leadership, ISI stagnated, unable to 
hold territory and increasingly alienating 
the Sunni community it claimed to repre-
sent. U.S. efforts to begin working with 
Sunni Arabs in Iraq, particularly tribal 
groups, starting in 2007 (broadly lumped 
together in American parlance with the 
later troop escalation, or “surge”), further 
weakened the position of ISI.
Two nearly simultaneous events 
reversed ISI’s fortunes. First, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi took over ISI in 2010.30 Bagh-
dadi proved a skillful leader, able to rally 
his troops and think creatively. Second, by 
March 2011 the Arab Spring protests had 
come to Syria, rapidly leading to a mili-
tarized response by the regime and, over 
time, its loss of control over large swaths 
of Syrian territory. It was in this vacuum 
that ISI reorganized and recovered from 
its near destruction in Iraq. The vehicle 
for ISI’s entry into the Syrian conflict was 
the Nusra Front in Syria (jabhat al-nusra 
fil-sham); indeed, Baghdadi and Zawahiri 
engaged in a public squabble over whom 
the Nusra Front belonged to. Having lost 
that argument when the head of the Nusra 
Front, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, de-
clared allegiance to al-Qaeda, ISI nev-
ertheless had become powerful enough 
to take and hold much of the Euphrates 
River valley in eastern Syria in the absence 
of government forces. The Nusra Front 
concentrated its efforts in the western part 
of the country, particularly Homs and Idlib 
provinces. Gaining significant territory in 
Syria in 2013 and early 2014 allowed ISI 
to declare itself an Islamic state in both 
Iraq and Syria, or ISIS.
The apex of ISIS history occurred 
in June 2014, when its forces rapidly 
spread out from its new base in Syria and 
took over Iraq’s second city, Mosul, and 
much of the territory where Sunni Arabs 
held a demographic advantage. On June 
29, 2014, from the pulpit of the twelfth-
century Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul, 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi formally declared 
the re-establishment of the caliphate and 
proclaimed himself the new caliph. The 
territorial expansion of ISIS quickly hit its 
natural limits — Sunni Arab areas with-
out a meaningful state presence in Iraq 
and Syria — and during the ensuing three 
years, Iraqi, Kurdish and American forces 
slowly drove ISIS back. As of this writ-
ing, it appears likely that ISIS will lose 
its territorial caliphate sometime in 2017, 
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although it will likely continue to exist as a 
jihadi group for some time to come.
This brief summary of the develop-
ment of ISIS as the third wave of global 
jihad has stressed the differences between 
ISIS and al-Qaeda, even though some of 
the roots of ISIS were in al-Qaeda. Those 
differences can be further refined, beyond 
personal rivalries and diverging histories, 
by focusing on four issues: the nature of 
the overarching societal problem faced, 
the solution to that problem, the strategy to 
achieve the requisite solution, and the orga-
nizational vehicle to carry out that strat-
egy. Al-Qaeda considered the overarch-
ing problem to be the durability of local 
apostate regimes that resulted from their 
ties to Washington. Al-Qaeda believed that 
if those ties were broken and the Americans 
driven out, the apostate regimes would 
begin to fall. By contrast, ISIS focused on 
neither the far enemy nor the takfiri regime, 
but on apostasy itself. According to this 
thinking, Muslims cannot be truly Muslim 
unless and until they live in an Islamic state 
that implements sharia. It was a simple but 
appealing argument, much easier to market 
and recruit with than an arcane “far enemy” 
doctrine. Thus, ISIS focused on the req-
uisites of state creation, a focus al-Qaeda 
did not share. However, to the degree that 
ISIS concentrated on state-building issues, 
it was through a sectarian lens: Shia rule in 
Baghdad and Damascus must be replaced 
(eventually) by rule by the caliphate. 31 
One of the striking things about the Syrian 
civil war is just how little ISIS has fought 
against Syrian regime forces, preferring to 
battle local groups to hold onto territory, its 
first priority.
The second major difference between 
al-Qaeda and ISIS was the solution to the 
overarching problem. For al-Qaeda, the 
way to make local apostate regimes fall 
was to drive out their international support, 
the United States. For ISIS, the solution 
to societal apostasy was to forcibly purify 
society, allowing its members to live pious 
lives under sharia. 
Those solutions need different strate-
gies. For al-Qaeda, the strategy was to 
direct violent attacks against American tar-
gets, both civilian and military. For ISIS, 
the strategy was to grab and hold territory, 
declare a state, and implement true sharia 
(or at least the ISIS interpretation of it). 
Savage violence was essential to create the 
conditions to implement that strategy. 
Finally, the organizational form needed 
to implement the strategy was completely 
different. Al-Qaeda saw itself as an elite 
vanguard. To al-Qaeda, recruiting the right 
types of jihadis was more important than 
mass recruitment. By comparison, mass re-
cruitment was the ISIS goal, and its media 
production reflected it. Baghdadi and oth-
ers routinely put out the call for all Mus-
lims — and especially those with needed 
talents — to join them in their caliphate. 
ISIS had its leadership stratum, of course, 
but saw itself as a mass-based populist 
movement, not an elite force.
There are a large number of primary 
texts that lay out the ideology (and evo-
lution) of ISIS. Perhaps the three most 
important are the 2004 book The Manage-
ment of Savagery (idarat al-tawahhush), 
the 2004 letter of allegiance from Zarqawi 
to Bin Laden and the 2014 speech by 
Baghdadi announcing the caliphate.32 The 
Management of Savagery better describes 
the strategic use of extreme violence by 
ISIS than any other work. For its author, 
Abu Bakr Naji (a pseudonym), over-the-
top savagery is needed in order to force the 
state to disengage from parts of its claimed 
territory. Drawing on the experience of Al-
geria in the 1990s, Naji’s idea was notably 
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put to use in Iraq, where ISIS (AQI, ISI) 
was easily the most vicious in its imple-
mentation of post-2003 violence. Once in 
power in its territorial state, ISIS continued 
to implement Naji’s call to savagery, as it 
served a number of political purposes.
What these documents have in com-
mon (along with other ISIS documents) 
is an emphasis on three issues: creating a 
territorial state, virulent anti-Shiism and 
the use of spectacular violence for politi-
cal ends. These ideological foci strongly 
differentiate the third wave of global jihad 
from the first two. The most important 
point was the push for a territorial state 
as soon as possible. Other jihadi groups, 
even those that support a new caliphate in 
theory (most view it as an inevitable step 
in the future), have been reticent to declare 
a caliphate, primarily because if it were to 
be defeated and disappear, it would consti-
tute a historical disaster for the movement, 
likely setting it back decades. Al-Qaeda 
warned ISIS against declaring a caliph-
ate for exactly this reason. However, once 
ISIS had declared it, to great excitement 
in some quarters, al-Qaeda responded, 
falsely, that it had already declared a new 
caliphate earlier. 
The emphasis on immediately declar-
ing a territorial state as the central necessi-
ty of jihad dates back to Zarqawi, although 
he was killed just months before the first 
declaration of a new state was made in 
2006. As ISIS’s territorial caliphate shrinks 
and disappears, its critics will likely have 
been proved right about the folly of such a 
declaration. Conversely, it may be argued 
that the ISIS experience, however heinous 
in many ways, put the idea of re-estab-
lishing the Islamic caliphate on the front 
burner in the Muslim world. However, 
those outside of ISIS who support the idea 
would likely attempt to implement it in 
a more humane and historically accurate 
fashion.
Perhaps what set ISIS apart from its 
jihadi competitors was its brilliant market-
ing strategy, making global jihad cool for 
the small segment of the world’s popula-
tion it targeted: young, somewhat mar-
ginalized males seeking glory and mean-
ing in their lives.33 Declaring a caliphate 
was a stroke of genius, no matter that 
every major cleric in the Muslim world 
who weighed in on the subject dismissed 
Baghdadi’s declaration as wrong-headed 
on many different levels.34 For market-
ing and recruitment purposes, it was the 
sexiest, most outrageous — and most 
effective — move Baghdadi could have 
made, stirring the imagination of some 
Muslims. For young men willing to come 
and fight for the caliphate, ISIS promised 
a sort of Disneyland for jihadis: infinite 
thrills from doing outlandish things with 
little real-world accountability. The gore-
stained videos that ISIS regularly put out 
repulsed most Muslims, but captured the 
imagination of just enough of its target 
demographic.35 ISIS never sought the ap-
proval of the keepers of Islamic tradition 
(the ulama), wanting instead to create its 
own imagined history. Even Zarqawi’s 
mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one 
of the few clerics with a track record of 
supporting jihadi movements, denounced 
his former pupil.36 In the end, the ulama 
decisively rejected the ISIS program and 
its ephemeral caliphate.
PERSONAL JIHAD, FROM 2001
The gradual destruction of the ter-
ritorial caliphate in the 2015-17 period 
represented the demise of the third wave of 
global jihad, even though acts of violence 
will no doubt continue to be carried out in 
the name of ISIS from time to time. The 
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quest for and accomplishment of the ter-
ritorial state was the defining characteristic 
of the third wave, so its destruction would 
represent a mortal blow. It is possible that 
a new territory could be found to revive 
the caliphate, but, given the ISIS experi-
ence, this is not a likely outcome. In the 
aftermath of the Islamic State, global jihad 
has moved into its fourth wave, likely to 
be its most durable.
The fourth wave of global jihad began 
nearly simultaneously with the third, 
although it was much more closely linked 
with the 2001 defeat of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and the loss of the al-Qaeda 
“emirate” there, than with the 2003 Iraq 
war. This wave was born of desperation 
and defeat, and focused on the idea of 
surviving to fight another day. At a time 
when global jihad was on the cusp of 
elimination, given Osama bin Laden’s 
enormous blunder in attacking the United 
States, what strategy was needed to keep 
hope alive, to keep the movement going 
until circumstances improved enough for a 
rebirth of global jihad? 
It fell primarily to Abu Musab al-Suri 
to devise a strategy for desperate times. 
Suri, whose birth name was Mustafa 
Bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar, was 
global jihad’s most nimble and widely read 
theorist. Born in Aleppo, Suri got his start 
in jihadi circles during the Muslim Broth-
erhood’s armed campaign to overthrow 
the Syrian regime of Hafiz al-Assad in the 
early 1980s. That effort came to defeat in 
1982, when the city of Hama was pulver-
ized by the Syrian army, leading to the 
deaths of thousands of Syrians and the 
effective surrender of the Muslim Broth-
erhood. Suri escaped Syria for Europe, 
ultimately marrying a Spanish woman and 
gaining Spanish citizenship, thereafter 
splitting his time between Europe and Af-
ghanistan/Pakistan. He remained active in 
jihadi circles and is still wanted by Spain 
regarding two deadly acts of terror, includ-
ing the 2004 Madrid train bombings that 
killed nearly 200 people. Suri was captured 
in Pakistan in 2005 and handed over to 
the Americans, who reportedly rendered 
him to Syria, where he was a wanted man. 
While there are numerous Internet rumors 
about Suri’s fate, given the absence of reli-
able sightings for over a decade, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that he is now dead.
Suri was among the most prodigious 
writers of all the jihadi ideologues. In the 
years following the failed uprising in Syria 
in the early 1980s, he wrote a 900-page 
book (in Arabic) on the “Islamic Revolu-
tion” in Syria that analyzed the reasons for 
its failure. It was these “lessons learned” 
that he wanted to apply to the global jihad, 
in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Suri went 
through the same exercise after the fall 
of the Taliban and the loss of the jihadi 
Islamist emirate in Afghanistan in 2001, 
publishing a 1,600-page manifesto on the 
Internet, Call to Global Islamic Resistance 
(dawat al-muqawama al-islamiyya al-
alamiyya).37 It is this book that forms the 
intellectual cornerstone of the fourth wave 
of global jihad. What sets Suri apart from 
every other jihadi ideologue is his ability 
to engage in self-criticism and to call out 
mistakes his own movement has made. He 
considered Bin Laden’s decision to attack 
the United States on September 11, 2001, 
to be an error of historical significance.38
Well-read in literature on guerrilla 
warfare, Suri was unusual in drawing on 
lessons from outside the Muslim world in 
order to inform the global jihad. And the 
strategic environment that Suri faced was 
not unusual in the annals of the subject: 
how to best undertake action following 
the defeat of massed, territorial-based 
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troops? Indeed, it was Suri’s willing-
ness to draw on non-Muslim sources that 
further antagonized the purists among 
the global jihadis, with whom Suri had 
a long-running feud. He coined the term 
“Salafi-jihadi” and did not use it in a 
complimentary fashion. For Suri, among 
the principal impediments to the success 
of global jihad were puritans who refused 
to cooperate with other jihadis if they did 
not share absolute agreement on all points 
of theology. He witnessed such inflex-
ibility among Arab Salafi-jihadis fighting 
in Afghanistan, who refused to cooperate 
with the Taliban because they viewed them 
as not sufficiently Muslim. The Taliban, 
like most Pushtun Muslims in Afghanistan, 
incorporate elements of the ancient tribal 
code of pushtunwali in their understanding 
and practice of Islam, a practice foreign 
to other Muslims. Suri stressed the impor-
tance of strategic cooperation among dif-
ferent jihadi groups, even when there were 
minor points of theological or ideological 
difference, advice he was never particu-
larly successful at convincing puritanical 
Salafi-jihadis to follow. 39
Much in Suri’s arguments is common 
to other global jihadis, particularly those 
of the al-Qaeda strain. He believed that 
there is, in fact, a global war against Islam 
led by the United States, designed to keep 
the Muslim world weak and to plunder 
its resources. Suri argued that violence 
is a necessary central feature of resisting 
the war on Islam, and that such “military 
operations” must include attacks on civil-
ians. Indeed, there is a ritualistic nature 
to Suri’s call for violence, reminiscent of 
Franz Fanon’s argument in The Wretched 
of the Earth about the cleansing quality 
of killing one’s oppressor with one’s own 
hands, to feel his blood on your skin.40 It 
is quite likely that Suri had read Fanon’s 
work about the Algerian revolution against 
France, as he closely followed the later 
civil war in Algeria in the 1990s. Spec-
tacular and gory violence and its ritual 
importance were central to Suri’s ideas on 
how the global jihad should be waged and 
have impacted ISIS thinking as well. Other 
parts of his arguments are likewise famil-
iar, including his agreement with Abdullah 
Azzam (whom he knew) that global jihadis 
must avoid the temptation to indulge in 
takfir, fighting fellow Muslims through the 
threat of excommunication. He also shared 
the common jihadi contempt for the ulama, 
for their role in weakening the Muslim um-
mah over many decades, even centuries.
Suri’s strategy for the survival of global 
jihad in desperate times, of keeping hope 
alive, focused primarily on three elements. 
First, he believed that the global jihad had 
entered a period of jihad fardi or “personal 
jihad.” The idea has entered the English 
language as “leaderless jihad.”41 Because 
the Afghan emirate had been lost, and 
thus the critical aspect of territoriality of 
the movement was gone for the foresee-
able future, it was important for individual 
Muslims and groups of like-minded jihadis 
to undertake small-scale violence around 
the world in the name of global jihad. Suri 
realized that such pinprick attacks would 
not by themselves pose an existential or 
even a strategic threat to the United States 
and its allies. However, such attacks could 
keep fear alive in the minds of the enemy 
and would encourage other Muslims to 
undertake similar attacks, always under the 
banner of global jihad. Such “lone wolf” 
and small-cell attacks are virtually impos-
sible to entirely stop. In fact, many such 
small-scale attacks in the name of global 
jihad have been successfully undertaken in 
Europe, the United States, Canada and else-
where in the years since Suri’s call to arms 
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was published.42 Suri was correct, it seems, 
in suggesting that, while such attacks 
objectively pose little significant strategic 
threat, they do generate an outsized fear in 
many victimized nations, thereby keeping 
the hope of global jihad alive for the future.
The second critical feature for Suri was 
the use of the media and new information 
technologies. He was the first major jihadi 
ideologue to recognize the power of the 
Internet and call on jihadis to take full ad-
vantage of it. While global jihad was a se-
rious business, its marketing needed to be 
hip and savvy, appealing to a younger gen-
eration of Muslims in ways that stultify-
ing speeches by Ayman al-Zawahiri could 
never accomplish. While Suri disappeared 
from the scene years before ISIS was able 
to establish a territorial state, the ISIS mar-
keting department certainly learned from 
Suri’s arguments. Its vivid and gory videos 
of executions and battlefield exploits were 
celebrations of the type of media work 
Suri envisioned. As well, it was critical for 
individuals and small cells embarking on a 
personal jihad of violence to leave messag-
ing behind to insure that people knew their 
violence was not random criminality but, 
rather, global jihad.
Third, in the absence of a territorial 
state (which remained a long-term goal 
for Suri), individual jihadis should remain 
linked together in a virtual network made 
possible by new information technolo-
gies.43 The Internet and other media are not 
only useful in marketing jihad, but in or-
ganizing it as well, keeping jihadis linked 
together and learning from each other, 
even in the absence of a central hub. The 
al-Qaeda jihadi ideologue Anwar al-Awla-
ki demonstrated the role the Internet could 
play in linking together fellow jihadis and 
radicalizing them virtually. Awlaki, the 
most important global jihadi ideologue in 
the English-speaking world and an Ameri-
can citizen, was killed in Yemen in 2011 in 
a U.S. drone strike.
The era of “personal jihad” was par-
tially absorbed by ISIS, particularly as the 
territory under its control shrank. As the 
caliphate came under increasing pressure, 
ISIS called on all followers to engage 
in the type of violent personal jihads for 
which Suri had given an ideological and 
strategic foundation. Most of the 140 
terror attacks conducted or inspired by 
ISIS from June 2014 to February 2017 fit 
the Suri model of individual or small-cell 
operations.44 While such personal-jihad 
tactics have been adopted by ISIS, they are 
not fundamentally linked to its fortunes. 
Personal-jihad attacks are not foundational 
to the notion of an ISIS caliphate, nor 
will the likely disappearance of the ISIS 
caliphate mean the end of such attacks. 
The messaging of many acts of jihad al-
fardi in the West have included reference 
to ISIS or have been claimed by ISIS, 
but the two phenomena are not the same. 
Personal jihad in the Suri framework will 
long outlast the territorial state of ISIS and 
even the group itself as it transforms into 
a “regular” jihad organization.45 Because 
of both the pervasiveness of new media 
and the difficulty of detecting all acts 
of personal jihad in advance, this fourth 
wave of global jihad will likely prove to 
be the most durable. It represents more of 
a deadly nuisance that will murder people 
from time to time than a strategic threat, 
but it is already proving to be exception-
ally difficult to stop.46
CONCLUSION
This essay makes three broad argu-
ments. First, a distinct offshoot of the 
broader jihadi movement emerged in the 
1980s that made global claims and had a 
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global reach. Prior to this point, the various 
jihadi groups — those militants who used 
violence to advance their political agenda 
under the banner of Islam — that had aris-
en in the 1960s and 1970s were focused 
primarily or even exclusively on local 
issues, mostly local regime change. The 
Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghan-
istan in December 1979 was the precipitat-
ing event that gave birth to the global-jihad 
strand of thinking and organizing.
The second and larger claim in this 
essay is to argue for a reconceptualiza-
tion of the global jihad into four distinct 
waves, each coming out of a specific crisis, 
each with its own distinct ideological 
arguments, and each producing particular 
strategic goals and organizational forms. 
Borrowing from the Communist experi-
ence, I describe the first wave as that of 
the Jihadi International, a global band of 
mujahidin that would fight around the 
world in concert with local Muslims to lib-
erate occupied Muslim lands. The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan gave birth to this 
model, which essentially died out by 1990 
with the death of Abdullah Azzam and the 
failure of the model to be applied to Ku-
wait after Iraq’s invasion and occupation. 
The second wave of global jihad, America 
First, was birthed by Osama bin Laden 
beginning around 1996, as “near enemy” 
regimes proved to be durable in the face of 
jihadi pressure. 
The essential defeat of al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan by 2002 following the attacks 
of 9/11 left the hollow shell of a central or-
ganization, which continued to limp along 
until Bin Laden’s death in 2011. Militants 
allied with al-Qaeda then focused over-
whelmingly on local conflicts, in Syria and 
elsewhere. The Caliphate Now! third wave 
of global jihad arose from experiences in 
Iraq following the U.S. invasion in 2003 
and blossomed with the ungoverned spaces 
allowed by the Syrian civil war. The focus 
on creating a territorial Islamic state im-
mediately made the ISIS wave both unique 
and vulnerable, with the end of the territo-
rial “caliphate” likely to be realized during 
2017. The fourth wave, Personal Jihad, 
was the brainchild of Abu Musab al-Suri 
as he witnessed the destruction of the 
“Islamic emirate” in Afghanistan and the 
killing or capture of many of the leaders 
of the global-jihad movement. Networked, 
small-scale, media-savvy attacks around 
the world were his best means to keep 
hope alive during a period of defeat.
The third broad claim in this essay is 
that the fourth wave of global jihad is a 
more durable form of organization and 
violence likely to be around for many 
years to come. Small-scale attacks can be 
murderous, to be sure, but do not constitute 
either an existential threat or even much of 
a strategic threat to the West. Their ability 
to create havoc is more of a challenge to 
local countries in the Muslim world, but 
even there, sober perspective is needed to 
assess actual levels of threat. The only re-
ally plausible route for global jihad to rise 
to the level of strategic threat is for major 
powers to respond poorly, to over-react, 
thereby polarizing relations between the 
West and the Muslim world. In the words 
of ISIS, such polarization would help re-
move the “gray zone” and make the strate-
gic context more suitable to jihadi goals.47 
This was a classic Vanguard/Leninist tactic 
to provoke the state into over-reaction, but 
one that has rarely worked well in practice.
The four waves of global jihad each 
arose out of a specific crisis. The waves 
themselves represent one response to each 
of those crises and are not part of some 
broader grand conspiracy of stages. To 
be sure, those conspiracies of stages do 
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exist in the fertile minds of some jihadi 
ideologues, including Abu Bakr Naji in 
his Management of Savagery, mentioned 
above.48 But global jihad is, at base, a rela-
tively marginal movement that simply does 
not have the power to force a specific evo-
lution of history to its benefit and ultimate 
victory. The totality of all global jihadi 
fighters in these four waves numbered 
fewer than 100,000 men, about the size of 
one small city in the Muslim world. The 
outsized attention that global jihadis have 
generated over the past four decades de-
rives both from their own acts of spectacle 
and violence, and from the power of the 
information revolution around the world to 
unduly glamorize political murder. 
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